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This thesis is an analysis and critique of the
techniques used in the U. S. Navy for motivation of enlisted
personnel. The writer does not claim to be qualified to
give solutions to the many phases of this intriguing prob-
lem, but does bring more than two decades of experience and
one year of study of Navy department published and unpublished
material, educational, psychological and business publications,
and opinions of experienced Naval Officers along this line, to
bear upon it. Three different, but somewhat related phases
will be analyzed:
1. Basic psychological requirements for motivation.
2. Discipline as a motivating factor.
3. Competition as a means of motivation.
Much has been written, both in the Navy and out,
upon the subject of motivation, but to the writer's knowledge
no single publication exists that adequately covers this subject
as applicable to Navy personnel. Many of these reference books
contain platitudes such as "keep smiling", "work hard", "be
tactful", etc., while other books give technical psychological
dissertations iipon patterns of human behavior. The writer is
convinced that there is no one answer, right or wrong, to the
many problems that exist in the field of motivation. Rather,
1

2there are some basic assumptions that should be understood
and appreciated and used when applicable.
The mission of this thesis is not to cover the
field of emotional leadership based upon the lives of out-
standing naval officers or successful businessmen, but to
present, analyze, and criticize objectively the techniques that
may be used to gain and maintain the interest of enlisted
personnel. While no radical changes are recommended, some
suggestions are made which are believed to be of value to the
Navy. The reader may not agree, or, he may have better solu-
tions to the problem than those given in this thesis. owever,
it is hoped that this paper will bring to the attention of all
officers and candidate officers the significance and the need




BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL RE 1 TS FOR MOTIVATION
Introduction
In the past one hundred and fifty years the world
has passed through an industrial revolution. I:ass produc-
tion methods have changed man ! s way of living from that of
the individual craftsman with a source of work satisfaction
to that of a machine operator where a lack of intelligence is
sometimes an asset instead of a liability, Groups of anthro-
pologists, sociologists, and psychologists have spent years
and millions of dollars on elaborate expeditions to the south
sea islands to observe, analjze and report on various facets
of primitive tribal life; while, at the same time, they have
neglected one of the most fruitful sources of 3tudy - - the be<
havior of men who are performing nonotonoxis and repetitious
tasks on an assembly line behind brick walls.
During the same period our Navy has passed throu
a similar transformation from iron men and wooden ships to
skilled technicians and ships or planes that are feats of en-
gineering skill. The old seaman had a sense of achievement
when reefing a topsail during a blow; but, does our modern
sailor feel the same way about reading a battery of precision
gauges and recording the results in a log? Are we naval offI-

4eers making an error of omission similar to the social
scientists 1 in depending too much on emotional leadership
obtained by reading such books as "A Message to Garcia,"
rather than analyzing and utilizing basic psychological fac-
tors governing human behavior?
' otivating personnel is an aspect of the larger prob-
lem of managing personnel . Since it concerns itself exclu-
sively with human behavior, about which there is still much
to be learned, any treatment of the study of motivating per-
sonnel is likely to be indefinite and based upon opinions
rather than on careful scientific research* Yet there is
sufficient material available to remove this problem from the
realm of meta-physical garbling, so common to leadership
lectures, and reduce It to a few general principles which will
permit a functional approach.
The subject of motivation is approaching the status
of a separate field in psychology with its own methods, princi-
ples, and techniques. There are many definitions for the word.
Skinner defines motivation as: ". * . any situation in which the
object is to arouse interest and action according to a goal or
objective." -*- For the purposes of this r>aper, the writer pre-
fers to define motivation as the objective to gain and maintain
interest in t e Navy on the part of all hands.
There are a number of techniques that have been used
for motivation of Navy personnel. These have been tested
through generations of naval leadership and have proved highly
^•Charles S« Skinner (ed. ), Educational Psychology
(New York: Prentice-Kail, Inc., 1946), p. 194.

satisfactory. The problem frequently lies not so much in know-
ing what they are as in deciding which one to employ and when.
These principles will be presented in as meaningful a manner
as possible in order that they may be used by officers and
candidate officers for motivation as a technique of person-
nel administration.
Desires for Recognition and Security
As a group, psycholo -lists differ on many aspects in
the field of psychology. They are divided into various schools,
usually founded upon a theory developed by an eminent member.
There is even considerable difference of opinion in each group
as to terminology and definitions used in descriptions of basic
theories accepted by the school. However, all psychologists
appear to agree on two of the fundamental drives that motivate
men's actions when such basic drives as fear, hunger, love,
and sex are satisfied. These are the desires for recognition
and for security. These drives are always present, but seldom
satisfied, in all men from early childhood to the grave.
One of the most significant surveys ever made in
the field of human relationships is "The Hawthorne Studies". 2
This study was carried on in Western Electric Company's plant
at Hawthorne, Illinois, over a period of sixteen years, from
1924 to 1940. The original purpose of the experiments was to
find out the relation of the quality and quantity of illumina-
tion to the efficiency of industrial workers. The early results
obtained were so contradictory and startling that other institu-
2P. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Jickson, lianacement
_and the Worker
. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.)

6tions such as the Harvard Business School, the Rockefeller
Foundation, and the Ilassachusetts Institute of Technology,
"became interested in the work. Books have been written cov-
ering certain aspects of the experiments.
In one experiment the workers were divided into two
isolated groups for winding induction coils. One group, the
control group, was to work under a constant intensity of illu-
mination while the other, the experimental group, was to work
under a varying intensity of light. Careful and scientific
preparations were ma:"ie to measure the quality and quantity of
work turned out. The illumination was increased for the "ex-
perimental group" and production increased. Illumination was
decreased and production increased. Then the startling discov-
ery was made that not only had the experimental group increased
production to a marked extent, but so had the control group.
The experiment to determine the effectiveness of illumination
upon production was a failure, but one thing was certain; a
new, unknown factor had been introduced with increased produc-
tion in both groups.
Additional experiments were made in segregated groups
of workers, and various factors of working conditions were
changed. Hours of work were decreased, additional rest periods
given, hot lunches served, and hours of work increased; but al-
most invariably production was upped. The reason for this in-
creased production finally determined by the researchers was
the attitude of the workers. The workers had come to feel im-
portant during these experiments and felt that the work they

7were doing wa s important.
The significant point of these studies is summed
up by Stuart Chase who stated:
For their neglect of the human function of produc-
tion, managers have paid a high price in strikes, re-
stricted output, revolts, and a vast sea of human waste.
They have not realized that an ago-old way of life has
been destroyed, and that something equally binding must
be put in its place or the machine age will ultimately
smash up.
The best insurance against the totalitarian dan-
r, we are told, is to 'make democracy work. f To some,
this means only obtaining a high industrial output and
military efficiency. To others, it means giving plain
citizens new satisfaction and a new spirit, making each
one feel deeply that he counts. The discoveries at
Hawthorne suggested that both results can be achieved
by one and the same method. They apply to little fac-
tories as well as to large,. ,.,Shere is an idea here so
big that it leaves one gasping.
The results of the Hawthorne studies have been so
amazing that they lead one 4 to believe there i3 probably no
field in the art of motivation with such wide possibilities
for improvement as the work of instilling a sense of security
and recognition in Navy men of lower ranks. Some officers ac-
complish this feat deliberately, others unconsciously, while a
fex? officers fail to recognize the problem. The importance of
recognizing the problem of establishing a sense of security and
a sense of recognition is considered so essential to motivation
that each of these items will be discussed separately.
Desire for Recognition
The desire for recognition exists in all individuals.
The admiral wants recognition just as much as the seaman second
Stuart Chase, Ken at ^ork , (New York: Hareourt,
Brace and Co,, 1945), p. 27,

8class. The probable reason that so many officers of high rank
tend to tell "sea stories" based upon their own experiences is
that few dare to pat them on the back, or those who do have
selfish reasons, compelling the officers to do their own prais-
ing in order to satisfy a desire for recognition.
In developing the subject of the desire for recognition
it is possible to set. down a general principle upon which to base
one important technique of motivation:
"Every officer should act in such a way that each
contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and
-lakes him feel that what he is doing is important,"
There are few of us who do not ret a glow of satis-
faction when receiving the Navy's classical expression of, "well
done," particularly if it comes from one who uses the phrase
sparingly, i^ixcessive praise can be overdone and develop conceit
or the "prima donna" attitude in men or in a unit, which cannot
be tolerated in a military organization. Too nuch praise also
has the possibility of losing its power as a stimulant in moti-
vating men to do routine work. Praise should be reserved for
men who accomplish tasks above and beyond the normal call of
duty. On the other hand, in the development of a sense of
achievement it is considered more desirable to give too much
praise to individuals rather than not enough.
Everyone recognizes the importance of personal prob-
lems in dealing with men. In the Hawthorne Studies4 it was
found that standardized questions for interviewing workers were
^Roethlisberger and Dickson, op. cit
.. pp. 223 - 226.
^
not satisfactory as many workers were affected by what seemed
to the interviewers insignificant problems. Host of the prob-
lems were not important to the company, but they were important
to the individuals. When the interviewer took an interest in
the worker f s problems, his efforts resulted in considerable
therapeutic value to the worker and indirect assistance to the
company.
Probably one of the greatest fields of improvement
for developing a sense of recognition of men in the Havy is the
use of names instead of numbers. Ho one likes to be addressed
as "hey you," and sometimes with added sarcasm, "with the hat
on the back of your head." A naval officer should pride him-
self upon knowing the name of every man in his division and
as much about each man's personal history as possible. A refer-
ence to a man's family or to his home state makes him feel im-
portant and shows that his officers are interested In him.
'"any men feel that it is more Important to be known unfavor-
ably than not to be known at all. This Is one of the reasons
why some men are disciplinary problems; they are unable to gain
status by favorable recognition and resort to infractions of
regulations to gain recognition of one kind or another.
For a man to gain a sense of recognition the three
following conditions must be fulfilled:
1. He must feel Important to himself.
2. He must feel important to his associates.
3. He must feel important to his superiors.
Practically every study on record of employees'
grievances has put wages all the way from sixth to fifteenth
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in importance to the worker, 5 while sense of recognition
varies from one to four in importance. Although money re-
ceived in promotion in the Navy is no small factor, it is
not as important as the prestige and status that go with the
rank or rate. Some officers will remember the promotion from
plebe to third classman as the biggest promotion received in
the Navy. There was no increase in pay, but a marked difference
in status.
It is not easy for officers to make men feel that
they are genuinely important to the Imvy. The men must be
made to feel for certain:
1. That the officer is interested in their welfare.
2. That the officer would go out of his way to help
them.
3. That the officer has confidence the men are able
to do their jobs.
During a visit to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot in
San Diego, an experienced marine officer was asked for an ex-
planation of the famous marine esprit de corps. While this
officer was not a trained psychologist, it was apparent that
he knew men, and furthermore the Marine Corps was an obsession
with him. His oral reply is summarized as follows:
The marine esprit de corps is definitely instilled
in the individual during the training at the Recruit
Depot. As soon as a newly enlisted man reports to the
Recruit Depot, he is given a military haircut and assigned
to a platoon along with about sixty other recruits. Three
5.. R # Spriegel, Principles of Business Organization .
(Hew York: Prentice-Ha 11, Inc., 1946), p. 435.
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or four experienced sergeants are detailed to each
platoon as instructors in order that each trainee can
be given expert individual training. The instructors
are carefully selected for this duty and serve not
only as teachers but as father confessors. These
Drill Instructors are tough on the men but are always
glad to give special instruction to backward recruits
as well as to aid them in solving personal problems.
In addition, the instructors are expected to be models
of neatness, military bearing, and efficiency. In
other words, they set themselves up as models after
which the new marines can pattern themselves.
During the first three weeks the recruit goes
through an extremely rigorous training schedule. Ho
liberty is given, and the man is kept so busy that he
has no time to catch up with himself. Hot only is the
recruit hardened physically and taught the fundamentals
of the military profession, but he begins to be instilled
with the traditional mental outlook of a marine. In all
of the training activities, the Drill Instructors con-
stantly remind the recruits that the marines are the
finest marksmen, that they have the best combat record
In the world, and that marines can do any job assigned
to them. Exploits of famous marines are described to
the new men. The object of this phase of the training
is not primarily to toach the recruits Marine Corps
history, but to make the new marines desire to live up
to the standards of the organization and to emulate the
deeds of former and present marines. The Drill Instruc-
tors repeatedly tell the trainee that if he can success-
fully complete his training, he can do anything that
other marines are capable of doing. Discipline is ex-
tremely rigid, and at the end of three weeks 1 time the
recruit has had about all that he can stand.
Then the recruit is taken to the rifle range where
the discipline Is relaxed somewhat. During the three
weeks on the range &• fires all the basic weapons which
are used by the ilarine Corps. Greatest emphasis is placed
on rifle marksmanship, and much effort is made to have
each man qualify with his primary v/eapon. The best rifle
shots In the Marine Corps are detailed as coaches for
the recruits. They use all their skill, knowledge, and
patience to have each trainee assigned to them qualify
with the rifle. A recruit is instructed by the same
coach for the entire time that he is on the range, there-
by insuring that each man gets not only Individual, but
also personalized attention.
The process of establishing the iarine Corps attitude
in each recruit is continued during this training. His
coach describes the shooting feats of the best riflemen
in the Marine Corps in matches and in combat. The recruit
has the satisfaction of having one of these famous shots
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personally Instruct him in shooting lore. These
coaches continuously tell the trainee that he too
can become a Distinguished Marksman if he follows
their directions. The success of the training on
the rifle range is demonstrated by the fact that
approximately ninety percent of the recruits qLialify
as Expert Rifleman, Sharpshooter, or Marksman* Kach
man who qualifies is presented a badge to wear on his
uniform which denotes his level of ability as a rifle
shot, -hile at the range, the recruit is given guard
duty with certain responsibilities and authority. He
is told that he is superior to soldiers and sailors,
and by this time he starts to believe that he is. The
recruit is made to feel that h.r is important and that
his job is important.
The recruit is then brought back to the Recruit
Depot from the rifle range, and for the last four weeks
of training he is made to live up to his new sense of
importance which lias been attained during his primary
training. If a recruit is negligent in a duty or breaks
a rule, it is usually sufficient for one of his superiors
to say, 'Marines do not do this type of thing, and you
are a marine as you have demonstrated in successfully
completing the recruit training up to this point, f
The writer is convinced that if the Marine Corps has
an esprit de corps superior to the Army or the Havy, it is due
primarily to the feeling of personal importance and job im-
portance that marines obtain during their recruit training.
Every billet in the Havy is important. Under no
circumstances should an officer give any indication that he
feels he is assigning an unimportant task to a man. On the
positive side this means he must insure that each man knows:
1. If he fails to do his job properly, the safety
of his ship and shipmates will be jeopardised.
2. That the crew depends upon ] ..*. - to do his job
well.
3. That his efforts, however far removed from the
guns, are just as important as firing the guns.
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oh more could be written on the importance of
making each man feel important as a basic psychological
requirement for motivation. Rather, the general principle
of tills theme will be repeated:
"Every officer should act in such a way that each
contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and
makes him feel that ?/hat he is doing is important."
.sire for Security
The desire for security is present in all who wish
to survive. It has wide implications. The coxswain of the
captain's gig is usually as much concerned about keeping his
rate as the captain is in maintaining his rank. The desire
for security is present at all levels in all persons.
In developing the topic of desire for security, a
second general principle will be advanced as a base for various
techniques of motivation:
"Every officer should act in such a way that each
contact he has with an enlisted man increases that man's sense
of security."
Again referring to the "Hawthorne Studies"
S
# when it
became necessary to discontinue these experiments during the
depression, a large number of the workers were laid off. One
would imagine that during this period of uncertainty the
workers would be exerting every effort to increase production
in order to keep their jobs. This was not the case, as production
^Roethlesber.r;;er and Dickson, op. cit .» p. 247.
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actually fell off dtie to the feeling of insecurity, anxiety,
and worry among the workers.
In developing a feeling of security, one should
recognize that two types of security are involved: Security
in the present, and security In the future. The men must
feel, moreover, that whatever is in store for them will be
for their best interests and welfare.
Present security , - Alien a man reports aboard ship
or a new station, or when there is a change In command, he
usually feels insecure. It is not the strictness with which
the rules and regulations are enforced that bothers him, but
rather it is not knowing the rules and regulations, not know-
ing what actions are expected of him, or not knowing what are
his rights, that will confuse him and lead to Insecurity,
As a whole, industry goes to considerable trouble and
expense to make new workers feel secure. This begins with a
member from the personnel office escorting the worker to the
job and introducing him to his boss and fellow workers. There,
usually, is another worker appointed as his guide until he
becomes oriented.
Officers would do well to consider the emotional
impact and sense of insecurity that exists when new recruits
report aboard, and realize the necessity for making them feel
secure before starting their new assignments. A short period
of orientation under the supervision of an experienced petty
officer should be given new men reporting aboard. Ship's
Orders, Ship's Organization Book, Watch-Quarter-and Station
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Bill, and other organizational features should be carefully
explained to them. If practicable, short tours through
various parts of the ship should be made. Such actions will
not only make the new men feel more secure aboard ship, but
will make them feel that they "belong" to the Navy.
There is one grave danger that must be avoided in
the attempt to give men a feeling of security. No man must be
led to feel that regardless of what he does nothing will happen
to him. Rather, he should realize that as long as he does his
work properly, obeys the rules, and carries out regulations,
his security is assured.
For men to develop a sense of security it is essen-
tial they feel at all times that they are be'ng treated justly,
fairly, and impartially. It was found by interviewing workers
in the "Hawthorne Studies" 7 that a very high percentage of com-
plaints was not due to the policies of the company or working
conditions, but to some fancied or real unfairness imposed
upon the worker which upset his social equilibrium. The assign*
ment of a desk or placement at the work bench freqtiently made
the worker feci an injustice had been done him with the result-
ant los3 of security. Every effort should be made to make men
feel they are being treated justly and fairly*
Future security . - A man might feel perfectly secure
in the present but so seriously disturbed by the uncertainties
the future offers that he does not do his work well. This point




When a man's enlistment i3 about to expire, or if he knows
that he will he transferred shortly, the uncertainty of the
future disturbs him to such an extent that his work suffers.
Uncertainty is the father of rumor, and rumor prob-
ably disttirbs men more than any other item. It is well to
remember that uncertainty is almost always worse than certainty,
however serious the certainty may be. liany commanders recog-
nized this problem during the war and had scheduled broadcasts
over the loudspeaker system informing the crew what had been
accomplished during the day and what was expected in the future.
As a rule the crew did not desire confidential information of
future operational plans, but did want to know where they were
headed and why. It is hoped the Navy will recognize the im-
portance of these broadcasts and continue during peacetime to
keep the men informed of what is going on as a technique of
motivation.
Confidence of the men in an officer's ability is
essential to establish security among the crew. This can be
well illustrated by the crew of a patrol bomber. Until the
crew have had an opportunity to pass judgment upon the ability
of the pilot, they will remain insecure, but after several
experiences in which the pilot shows good judgment and ability,
their fears of his getting them Into trouble dissipate. This
same attitude of the crew exists, to a lesser extent, In lar e
ships or other naval organizations.
Reactions to Frustration
This broad concept of frustration is mentioned in order
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to point out its results and to try to dispel the idea that
"griping" is always a healthy sign of morale among the crew.
One source describes frustration as follow*!
A man is frustrated when he has a strong need that
cannot be satisfied. There are various ways in which
the satisfaction of a need may be thwarted.
There may be an external obstacle. His commander
refuses him a leave ...
Or the obstacle may be internal. It may be another
conflicting need. You cannot always have both honor and
safety together, though you may need them both.
Sometimes the obstacle is not clear or specific.
Nevertheless a man may feel frustrated and do his best
to find some person or thing to blame, to serve as a
scapegoat . • .8
All men suffer frustration to a greater or lesser
de-ree. Some men have the ability to adjust themselves to the
external or internal obstacles and are said to have a high de-
Tee of frustration tolerance; while other men are unable to
adjust themselves to these obstacles are said to have a low
degree of frustration tolerance. It is unnecessary to point
out that seafaring is an unnatural way for men to live, nor is
it necessary to call attention to the fact that some men are
better adapted to the sea than others; but it is essential all
officers know that acute frustration will make motivation of
men extremely difficult If not impossible.
When a man becomes frustrated by meeting some exter-
nal or internal obstacle which he cannot overcome, one of two
things may happen: He may become angry and aggressive, usually
~E. G # Boring (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Ser-
vices , (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), "o. 319.

evidenced in the Mavy by "griping;" or, lie may become depressed
and fearful, developing the defeatist attitude commonly ideix-
tified v/ith the "sad sack" personality. The man is r:ore likely
to become aggressive and angry if he can possibly find a reason
to place the blame for his frustration upon some iiidividual
or external object such as the food served aboard ship.
If, however, a man is placed in a situation which
makes him feel inferior, or given a job assignment that he is
either physically or mentally unqualified to handle, he is
liable to place the blame upon his own lack of ability. This
individual is likely to become depressed or fearful, and in
extreme cases such depression may lead to suicide.
Of the two reactions to frustration, anger or ag-
gressiveness Is far more desirable than depression or fear.
Anger and aggressiveness have possibilities of being utilized
as a means of motivation if directed properly. Anger against
the enemy, against shirkers, or against other undesirable
objects, can be directed as a stimulus to get action of one
kind or another from frustrated men. On the other hand, re-
action to frustration by depression is far more serious, for
i the men become apathetic, worried, tired, and ineffectual.
Depressed men have given up the struggle, assumed a defeatist
attitude, and submissively resigned themselves to their fate.
In such individuals or groups of individuals there is little
griping* or aggressiveness, but as naval units they have little
value
.
The chances are heavily loaded
-,st any naval unit
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Irvine a group of men that are not frustrated in one way or
another. Yet there appear to be in the I-Iavy some squadrc
and ships that escape the overt reactions to frustration.
It Is the writer ! s opinion that one reaction to frustration
in the -avy has been the development of an exaggerated sense
of humor among men performing extended and arduous tasl^s of
work. Many observers have noted that men provisioning ships,
taking on ammunition, or engaged in other all hands jobs,
compete with one another in making "wise cracks." Some of
this humor is dull, so:: e of it is objectionable, but occasion-
ally a remark is made that gives the group a laugh. This
usually breaks the group tension and gives the men something
humorous to think about. The seaman whose Chief Petty Officer
informed him positively, colorfully, and in great detail that
his request for special liberty had been refused, blithely
informed the bystanders: "I'm the executive type; all 1 wanted
to know was ^es 1 or 'no 1 ." This anecdote is one of the legion
of examples of Navy humor.
This intriguing psychological phenomenon of exaggerated
humor in the Wavy warrants serious study by the students of human
behavior. Not only does this sense of humor serve as an escape
from frustration, but it is considered a major contributing
factor in the development of what is called "The Navy Spirit."
This cherished possession of Navy Spirit must be protected and
improved, if possible, as a powerful means of motivation.
-Recognition of Individual differences
The men of the rlavy differ from one another in hundreds
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of ways, with no two of them being alike in all respects.
They differ in height, weight, color of skin, size of feet,
shape of head, reaction time, manual dexterity, intelligence,
reasoning ability, education, emotional patterns, personality,
interests, opinions, attitudes, and in many other ways. In-
dividuals deviate from the norm to such a varying extent in
physical, mental, and emotional characteristics that it is
not possible to use a "go-no-go" gauge with any possibility
of success in the assignment of men to jobs* The fact that
Imvy men are given the same basic training; and placed in simi-
lar "bell-bottomed" trousers, certainly does not eliminate their
individual differences.
Naval organization Is, of necessity, based upon men
fitting the jobs, and not the jobs fitting men. However, in
the assignment of men to jobs, it is a requisite for motivation
that officers recognize individual differences. IJen like to
perform tasks in which they excel. On the other hand, they
soon lose interest, and in some cases become maladjusted, in
assignments that are beyond their physical, mental or emotional
capacity. Recognition of men's physical, mental, and emotional
differences Is considered so important for good motivation that
each will be listed and followed by a brief discussion.
Physical Differences
The obviously physically unfit re eliminated
in recruiting. Brtta 30, on varying la it from
5 f 6" to G f 6"; weighing fro: ..Imately 100 pounds to 250
pounds; and varying to the extremes in str: . The matter
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of physical strength a man possesses is not nearly so im-
portant in the Navy now as it was a hundred years ago#
Nevertheless, stamina and motor skills are important and
usually go with sound physical development.
Historically, physical development has played an
important role. At lea^t half of the curriculum of Ancient
Greek civilization was physical training. Physical fitness
has been prized in most countries either as a requisite for
military service or as a prerequisite for life adjustment.
It has been determined that physical activity and training
foster growth in motor skill ability.
Some men are capable of being trained to accomplish
highly complicated and precision feats that require muscular
coordination to a high degree, while other men of approximately
the same physical characteristics can only perform physical
feats requiring simple and uncoordinated muscular development.
There are also men who can perform complex tasks which require
a high degree of mental concentration under distracting con-
ditions, while other men are unable to perform simple tasks
under pressure.
The important point for officers and candidate offi-
cers to remember is that if a man is placed in a job requiring
muscular coordination which he is unable to perform, frustra-
tion of the individual is almost certain to occur. Fortunately,
there is ample opportunity in the Navy to observe men at work
and at play to determine those who have the ability to be train-
ed to perform highly complicated tasks, and those who have only

the ability to perform simple jobs. For example, observation
of a man's form, coordination, and stamina while playing
basketball will give the observer an excellent opportunity
to estimate his potentialities for later skill development.
An awkward guard is not likely to make a good "gun captain"
while an agile, well-coordinated forward is most likely to
be able \,o perform tasks requiring complex skills.
Difference in Intelligence
Intelligence is only one phase of an individual's
personality, but a very important one. Although it has been
known that individuals differ in intelligence? for many cen-
turies, only in recent years have psychologists been able to
measure variations in mental abilities with any degree of
validity. One authority defines intelligence as follows:
Intelligence, general: Defined as the ability of
a man to make use of his experience in adapting to new
situations. As frequently considered, it is composed
of two abilities: (1) General or verbal ability to
deal with ideas, ?/ords, and concepts. This is general
intelligence ; (2) Special or mechanical ability to
deal with objects, tools, things. This is called
spec ial intelli
.: ;ence .9
any different forms of intelligence tests have been
developed and used extensively, particularly in the field of
education. The Ilavy's basic battery of the General Classifi-
cation Test is considered one of the best groups of tests for
determining both general and special intelligence. These tests
are gaining much attention and favor among psychologists and
9L. A. Pennington, Lt. Col. R. B. Bough,
. . Chase,
The Psychology of Military Leadership
.
(Hew York: Prentlce-
Hall, Inc., 1945}, o. 269.
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educators. This battery of tests, given to all enlisted
men with results recorded on pages 4A and 4B of their
service record, is not infallible in determining a man's
intelligence Nevertheless, these tests do have high cor-
relation in both validity and reliability, and certainly are
superior to general estimates or guesses of a man's intel-
ligence.
ch valid information concerning a man's mental
abilities can be obtained from pages 4A and 4B of his service
record. Officers should become thoroughly familiar with the
aning of the marks in this record and utilize the information
as a guide in making assignments to schools or other tasks
requiring mental ability. It is nothing short of criminal to
assign a man a job which he is mentally incapable of perform-
ing. Such an assignment will invariably lead to dissatisfac-
tion in the man and possibly to maladjustment. Officers should
realize the damage done to a man's self-respect and self-con-
fidence when he is given a mental task which he is unable to
perform.
There are also men who have such high intelligence
quotients that care should be exercised in the assignment of
their duties. If such men are given simple jobs not commensu-
rate with their mental abilities, there remains the possibility
of maladjustment. Disciplinary problems often develop due to
the assignment of simple tasks which do not keep the intelligent
man sufficiently interested in his work.
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Differences in Personality Patterns
Just as there are differences in physical and
mental abilities of men, there is also a v/ide range of dif-
ferences in their personality patterns, Mot only do physical
and mental characteristics go to make up an individual's
personality, hut also the degree and intensity of his emotions,
such a3 love, hate, fear, anger, ambitions, and jealousy
*
Few terms are used more and less understood than that
of "personality," There are so many unmeasurable factors making
up a man's personality that the word defies a satisfactory
definition. One author lists over fifty definitions for the
word. Among the definitions considered of a more adequate
type is the one given by Dashiell:
An individual's personality is defined as his
system of reactions and reaction-possibilities in toto
as viewed by fellow-members of society. It is the sum
total of behavior trends manifested in his social ad-
justments • 10
en one is said to possess a "strong personality",
a "weak personality", or a "pleasing personality", it is an
expression of how that individual's behavior pattern affects
the speaker and may be not only misleading but also without
basis in fact. The point made here is that an individual may
evidence several different personalities when judged by the
reactions which he produces on different individuals.
Our consideration of this difficult and complex prob-
lem of personality patterns will be concerned with the factors
10j # p # Dashiell, Fundamentals of ' )b;j ec tive Psychology ^
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), p. 551.

25
or influences which bear a direct relationship to the
techniques of motivation, \7hatever may be the cause of these
variations in personality patterns does not concern t wy
more than indirectly. It is in recognizing their existence
and utilizing personnel to the fullest capacity that we can
a the greatest benefit.
Close observation of personality patterns by com-
petent officers is necessary for type casting or "personality
stereotyping" to be useful in predicting what a person will
do under various conditions. One author on the subject of
personality stereotyping states:
The fact remains, however, that, in forming our
behavior, we must try to predict what it3 effect will
be upon those to whom we adjust. The gap between our
ability to predict and the necessity for trying to pre-
dict has been abridged to a degree by resort to "per-
sonality stereotyping. f, 6 This is the trick of predict-
ing what a person will do in accordance with a type
classification rather than in accordance with actual
knowledge of his personality. The primitive war leader,
the sage elder of the tribe, or the crafty magic man
can know what to do even in times of crises, because
each knows the personality of the men and women in the
iich he must lead. Of course there are variables
to grapple with, for each member has some individual
traits. Long acquaintance with each personality, how-
ever, make 3 behavior fairly predictable. Thus the war
leader assigns his men to their separate tasks in terms
of their total personalities; in turn each member of the
war party can reasonably depend upon those with whom he
must work and upon whom his personal safety may be depen-
dent. By his intimate acquaintance with them he will be
enabled to adjust himself accordingly.il
Native ability and experience, rather than training,
appears to be the most successful means for development of the
art of personality stereotyping. This technique should be used
*««—>——m^mmammtmmtmmmm—— m i m M i i^*M^wWii»w>iw^iw»^wwi **mmmwmmmmmmm—mmmmmm**mmmmmmmn m »» mtmmimmmtmmmmmmtm^^m^hw^m^wwwm^^w—iww^wwMMi^^^i
llRichard T. LaPiere and Paul R» Farnsworth, Social
Psycholofcy
.




only in making initial assignment of tasks in an emergency,
then checked by observations whenever practicable. The
officer who thinks he can predict a man's ability in a
given job by his eyes, his hair, the shape of his chin, or
other anatomical characteristics, has little factual data
to support his contentions. Nevertheless, decisions do have
to be made in the assignment of tasks, and officers should
:e a sincere effort to estimate a man T s total personality
in the assignment and then carefully check the results by
close observation of the individual's pers nality in tens of
work performance. Certainly an intelligent, nervous, high-
strung man should not be assigned a simple repetitious task
if a dull, phlegmatic man is available. A careful and contin-
uous stiidy should be made of men's personality patterns with
the purpose of assigning personnel to jobs which will serve
the best interests of the individual and the liavy.
Conclusions
In summarizing this discussion of basic psychological
requirements for motivation, the following conclusions are con-
sidered to be important:
1. Every officer should act in such a way that each
contact with an enlisted man makes that man feel important and
that what he is doing is important.
2. Praise should be used to the maximum extent pos-
sible without losing its power as a stimulant.
3. An individual's personal problems are important
to the man and indirectly important to the Navy.
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4. Hen should be called by names rather than numbers,
very officer should pride himself on not only knowing each
f s name, but as much other information as possible about
him,
5, For an individual to feel important three fac-
tors are necessary:.
(a) He must feel important to himself,
(b) He must feel important to his shipmates, and
(c) Ho must feel important to his superiors,
6. Every billet in the rTavy is important, so every
man filling these billets is important.
7, Every officer should act in such a way that each
contact he has with an enlisted man increases that man's sense
of security,
0, lien feel insecure when first reporting aboard
a ship or on a change of command due to their not what
is expected,
9 # Uncertainty is the father of rumors, and rumors
disturb men's security.
10, Informing men by daily broadcast over the loud-
speaking system does much to decrease insecurity,
11, All men are subject to frustration in the Ilavy,
The most desirable reaction to frustration is a sense of humor
even though it may be e: rated. Our priceless heritage is
the n pirit" which is partially based upon this sense of
humor,
12, Officers should use every opportunity to observe
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men at work or play for motor skill development, and assign
men to manual tasks accordingly.
13. Intelligence is only one phase of an indivi-
dual's personality but an important one.
14. Officers should become thoroughly familiar with
pares 4A raid 4B of every man ! s service record and utilise this
information as a guide in making assignments.
15. No man should be assigned a mental task beyond
1 is capacity.
16. In making assignments careful consideration
should be given to the man's personality pattern.
17. Type casting should be used only in an emergency,




DISCIPLINE AS A MOTIVATING FACTOR
Introduction
In Chapter I the psychological requirements of
"sense of security", "sense of achievement", "frustration",
and "recognition of individual differences" were discussed
in order that the reader might appreciate the significance
of these psychological factors in the motivation of men.
In this chapter the history, theory, and effects of discipline
will be developed, and la addition, certain aspects of formal
and Informal organizations will be examined to show the rela-
tionship among organisation, discipline and motivation.
To some people the word discipline carries with it
connotations of severity, unreasonable curtailment of freedom,
restrictions, and adherence to arbitrary and unreasonable
demands of authority; while to others the word characterizes
so many aspects of military virtues that It loses much of its
meaning. Actually discipline is not synonymous with punishment.
According to the How International Dictionary of the English
Language, the original meaning of discipline was as follows:
1, The treatment suited to a disciple or learner:
education: development of the faculties by Instructions





It later came to mean:
2. Training to act in accordance with established
rules; accustoming to systematic and regular action;
drill.
Later meanings that are generally accepted today
and still in use include:
5. Subjection to rule; submissiveness to order
and control; habit of obedience.
4. Subjection to rule; chastisement inflicted by
way of correction and training; hence training through
suffering*
1
A broader and more functional approach to the sub-
ject of discipline will be taken in this chapter where disci-
pline implies subjection to a control exerted for the best in-
terests of the group.
History of Naval Discipline
Historically, many of our Articles for the Govern-
ment of the Navy existed before the adoption of the Constitu-
tion or the formation of the United States. One of the first,
if not the first, codes of maritime regulations applying spe-
cifically to discipline on naval ships was made in the twelfth
century by Richard, Coeur de Lion. These laws were based upon
sea laws derived from the Romans 1 laws of centuries before.
The Romans in turn had obtained them from Mediterranean cities
and states. The first American articles were adopted by the
Continental Congress in 1775, seven months before the Declar-
ation of Independence. These articles were taken from The
King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions and modified
3
-Kew International Dictionar?f of the ^n^lish Lanpua.^e
,
(Springfield! G. and C # lierriman Co., 1924), p. 634.
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where necessary to meet American Ideals. The present
articles, with numerous modifications, additions, and
amendments, basically are much the same as those first
used In the American Wavy.
In early days very severe punishments for viola-
tions of regulations were customary. The barbarity of
penalties inflicted was in keeping with the vindictive
theory of discipline. The severity of punishment was the
deterrent factor for maintaining group control. An early
instance was the penalty for a man found guilty of sleeping
on watch for the fourth time: he was to be tied to the
bowsprit, furnished with a biscuit, a can of beer and a
knife. There he had a choice of cutting himself loose and
drowning or starving to death.
It wasn f t until the time of our Civil .Var that the
use of severe type of punishment as a means of motivation was
discontinued. With the development of modern weapons and the
steam ship, it was found necessary to give officers and men
more initiative and freedom for independent action. Pear
of severe punishments being inflicted could no longer be
used as a means of disciplining men performing highly complex
tasks requiring judgment as well as physical coordination.
Experimental studies have proven conclusively that severe pun-
ishments as a means of motivation definitely interfere with
the accomplishment of difficult and complicated tasks which
require individual skill and coordination. One authority on
the subject of the motivating effect of punishment says!
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A considerable number of experiments bear on
the motivating influence of punishment, and the gen-
eral conclusion seems to be that punishment increases
human efficiency in many, but not all tasks. The
motivating effect of punishment seems to be a function
denendlng upon a number of factors, such as intensity
of^ punishment, complexity of task, stability of habits
involved, degree of insight, and individual differences
in the sensitivity of receptors. 2
It should be obvious that the Navy could never main-
tain effective control of personnel working in radio and radar
or operating other highly complex equipment if such discipline
were maintained by fear of severe punishment. It is essential
that men have a certain amount of leeway of action in order
to insure freedom of judgment in action.
Theory of Discipline
Throughout recorded history, human behavior has been
strongly influenced by religious beliefs. Horrible punish-
ments were inflicted upon individuals violating the dignity
of some ancienj deity, while even today 3ome men preach of
hell-fires and brimstone for those Y/ho fail to accept certain
theological doctrines. It Is but natural, therefore, to ex-
pect the evolution of discipline to parallel closely that
of religious doctrines and beliefs.
One authority lists five theories of discipline that
can be traced through history.3 These theories will be dis-
cussed because all of them apply to the Havy, and it is
2c. Li. Diserens and James Vaughn, "The latperimental
Psychology of Motivation, 11 Psychological Bulletin , /III (1931),
p. 40.
3 kelson Bossing, Progressive Ilethods of Teaching in




desirable that personnel should understand and appreciate
the development and implications of each.
1. The Vindictive Theory of Discipline.
The vindictive theory is an ancient conception
of discipline, and it is in harmony with the reli-
gions of primitive peoples. Their gods were thought
of as tyrants who wreaked vengeance upon any viola-
tors of the gods 1 honor or dignity. The people did
not hold these deities responsi le to any code of
ethics but felt that the gods 1 demands for personal
satisfaction must be met or terrible punishment
would result. Typical of this viewpoint is the
ancient theory, "The king can do no worng," which
prevailed until comparatively recent times.
The modern conception of this theory of disci-
pline is "do as I say and not as I do." Uuch criti-
cism levelled at military discipline after the last
war was based upon the alleged double standards of
discipline in effect; one for the officers, and one
for the enlisted men. As a matter of fact, the of-
ficer who raids a crap game in the crews f forward
living spaces and places the violators on report,
then proceeds to the ward room and engages in a game
of bridge for a wager of one-tenth of a cent a point,
is guilty of practicing the principles of the vindic-
tive theory of discipline. There is nothing contained
in the Articles for the Government of the Navy, Navy
ulritions, or General Orders and Instructions, in-
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eluding Naval Courts and Boards, that permits
punishment of enlisted men for an offense that
does not apply to officers*
2. The Retributive Theory of Discipline.
This theory is an improvement upon the vindic-
tive theory in that irresponsibility of inflictir
punishment was no longer condoned by the people. "An
eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth/1 illustrates
the Biblical conception of this theory. Even today
some states have fixed penalties for violations of
given crimes, such as the death penalty for murder in
the first degree*
This theory of discipline does have some values
that should not be ignored. It was used during the
last war by the Navy Department's policy assigning
fixed punishments for given "Absent Over Leave" and
"Absent Without Leave" offenses, which will be covered
in detail in a later part of this chapter. Known
punishments for designated offenses would do much to
prevent a few adventurous spirits from gambling on
the chance that they might escape with a warning or
else the punishment would be so light as to warrant
committing the offense. If men know that committing
a certain offense will bring retribution In the form
of a fixed penalty, they face the problem of deciding
whether or not committing the offense is worth the
risk of the penalty. At any rate, theoretically the




It is doubtful that the principles of the
retributive theory of discipline can or should be
entirely eliminated in the Navy. Rewards, usually
in the form of promotions, are partially based upon
a man's good conduct record, and certainly advance-
ments in rating are withheld unless the man has a
conduct mark above the required minimum. This is
the negative aspect of the theory of retribution,
3» The Deterrent Theory of Discipline.
The deterrent theory is a comparatively recent
development of discipline and lias some of the elements
of the doctrine of retribution. As far as practicable,
punishment is administered In public. This serves
two purposes: it tends to prevent the individual
from repeating the violation, and at the sa:e tine it
always serves as an example to other members of the
group to remind t- e. of the consequences for failure
to comply with the laws. Public hangings, public
whipping posts, and the stocks in the public square
are all historical examples of x>unishments not only
administered according to the retributive doctrine
for the offender, but to serve as a deterrent to
future violations. In school the theory resulted in
making the student stand in the corner and wear a
"dunce cap", or in other forms of punisliment inflicted
before the rest of the class.
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The deterrent theory of discipline is used to
some extent in the llavy. The one gun salute and
breaking the union jack at the yardarm is a device
to remind the officers and men of the fleet that a
General Court Martial is in session. Publishing to
e cro\? at quarters the findings and sentences of
Summary and Deck Court I.Iartials is another neans of
reminding the crew that offenders have oeen punished
for violations of the regulations
«
Article 74 (3) (d) U. . cvy -egulations states:
Court-martial orders: These shall publish to
the service such extracts from the records of pro-
ceedings of courts martial and from the action of
the department thereon as may be deemed desirable.
They shall be signed by the Secretary of the ilavy.^
The deterrent theory is used extensively in main-
taining the negative type of discipline. It is based
upon fear of physical pain and loss of status for the
individual, and is also used as an example of what
will happen to others unless their conduct is satis-
factory. This subject will be discussed more completely
in another section of this chapter.
4. The Remedial Theory of Discipline.
The church and society became dissatisfied with
the negative approach to discipline as used in our
penal institutions. Fear as a restraining influence
upon men was not entirely satisfactory since would-
be violators were deterred only while they feared the
4-U, S» Navy Regulations , 1920. Reprinted 1952,
shingtoni Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 22,
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consequences • A more desirable approach Is to
place the •aphasia upon building institutions
not as punishment centers, but as reform agencies
to be used as a means of rehabilitating the indivi-
dual . Reform schools, prison farms, prisoner in-
dustries, r* son schools, etc., are all examples of
this project for human reclamation. The State of
California has been one of the leaders in the develop-
ment of the remedial theory of discipline. Warden
I>offy has made San cyuentin Prison an outstandir
example of what can be done in the rehabilitation of
prisoners.
The Navy has not lagged in the use of this theory.
Special boards of review, under the Secretary of the
-avy, carefully consider each court martial case be-
fore sentences are approved. Men with good prison
records are sent back to the service or discharged
after completing a part of their sentences. In t
past few years there has been a marked change in the
methods by which our prisoners are managed, with trained
penologists in charge of naval prisons. Determined
efforts are being made to rehabilitate and return to
the service men who are sent to naval prisons. The
Navy thinks of this theory of discipline as a means
of chan" bhe attitude and conduct of the prisoners
In order that they will desire to conform with the
standards of conduct required by the service.
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5. The Prophylaxis Theory of Discipline.
The prophylaxis theory goes one step beyond the
remedial theory in that it is advocated as a preven-
tive method instead of a cure. It has been estimated
that over two billion dollar:, is spent every year in
:.:rica to cover the cost to society of crime. T
now point of view It that if more money were spent to
prevent maladjustments, there would be less crime and
jrefore less need for - oney to correct the bad crime
situation that has been allowed to develop* As a
result, billions of dollars liare been expended to
build public parks, playgrounds, amusement centers
and golf links for the benefit of the public and in-
directly for the prevention of crime.
The Havy has carried on extensive work in the
development of the prophylaxis theory of discipline.
Athletic teams, movies, libraries, schools, recreation
centers, reading rooms, and chapels are only a few of
the many devices natilized as a means of developing the
right patterns of thought and the right habits of con-
duct among the men. The importance of using preventive
techniques in maintaining discipline cannot be over-
stressed as a means of motivating the men of the Navy.
Positive and Negative Discipline
In military circles discipline is too often the
of in the negative sense, while actually positive discipline
is much more effective and plays the more important part in any
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organization. However, it should be recognized that both
positive and negative discipline exist, not only in military
establishments but in business, schools, homes, clubs, and
any other organization where It is necessary to facilitate
group control.
The motivating effect of discipline cannot be deter-
mined by a scientific measuring scale. One of the factors
making psychological studies of human behavior so inconclusive
is the lack of a scientific measuring scale for behavior. Such
a scale cannot be devised for a mechanism as complex, incon-
sistent, and variable as the human being.
However, the effects of discipline as a motivating
factor can be rated roughly by means of an intensity scale.
We let one end of the scale represent positive discipline;
the other, negative discipline. The former represents intrin-
sic interest; the latter, fear. A large measure between these
two extremes will be a "neutral" zone which will represent
a combination in intensity of both positive and negative
discipline.
A seaman is ordered to paint the motor whale-boat
and does it in a seaman-like manner. Was the excellence of
his work due to positive or negative discipline? I'ost likely
it was within the "neutral" zone where he received a sense of
satisfaction from a job well done, but he also felt a sub-
concious fear of censure or punishment if he failed to do an
acceptable job. This same intensity of discipline exists in
schools where the students are concerned about their marks f
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in business where the worker is concerned about his job,
and in other organizations where discipline exists. Some
organizations are controlled by positive discipline and
some by negative discipline, but most operate under a com-
bination of the two.
Effects of Positive Discipline on Motivation
Positive discipline may be defined as the develop-
ment of that state of mind in which individuals or groups of
individuals will do the proper thing with or without specific
instruction. It might be stated that positive discipline is
the preventive while negative discipline is the cure.
No set of "golden rules" could be formulated that
would develop positive discipline in a naval organization.
Rather, certain attitudes should be analyzed and a scientific
approach made to the solution of the problem. Factors that
would be effective in one situation might be ineffective in
others, and techniques utilized by one officer might be totally
unsuitable for another.
A limited number of these factors which are considered
most significant will be listed. These v/ill be followed by
such discussion as is deemed desirable for the assistance ±
officers and candidate officers in making a critical and ana-
lytical approach to gaining and maintaining positive discipline
within their organizations,




This point goes back to the "sense of security"
discussed in the first chapter, in which it was shown
that all people desire to be secure, not only in the
present but in the future , This atmosphere is created
by the attitude of the officers, not so much in what
they do but in the way they do it. It is relatively
independent of the strictness with which rules and
regulations arc enforced,
2, Let the men know what is expected of them.
Personnel should have the ship's orders, regu-
lations, and other formal organization directives
explained to them. They should know their duties,
their places in the organization, and their respon-
sibilities in order to prevent errors and omissions
with a resulting loss of discipline,
3, Men should know for certain that their officers will
support them as long as they perform their duties to
the best of their abilities,
X'his point is particularly important for those
men assigned tasks requiring the exercise of judg-
ment, and where failure to use good judgment migjit
reflect discredit not only upon the man but upon his
officer, "Buck passing" at the expense of the men is
fatal to discipline, Responsibility for any I-Iavy
unit's performance of duty is rightfully fixed upon
the officers and cannot be shifted. This makes it
essential for officers to support the rien in the
accomplishment of any difficult assignment.
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4. The men should be kept informed of the progress
they are making,
en who are doing superior work should ^oiow it,
and those doing inferior work should "be told in order
that they may improve their performance. Knowledge
of one's progress is one of the greatest motivating
forces that can be used. The individual who works
hard and gets no apparent credit for his work is very
likely to give up # On the other hand, a man doing
inferior work may think he is getting away with some-
thing and then be sincerely disappointed when he is
not selected for advancement in rating,
5. The men should be informed, within security restric-
tions, of any changes that will affect their present
or future sense of security.
"Scuttlebutt" dope is prevalent on all ships and
has a tendency to spread half-truths or rumors. Offi-
cial information should be given to the men when prac-
tical before the rumors or "leaks" have an opportunity
to sprcid. If men know that they will always be given
adequate- warning of changes, they will not fear them
nearly so much.
6. The men must know that they will receive impartial
treatment with no favoritism shown to any Individual
or group of individuals.
This statement may appear so obvious that it need
not be made, yet it is one of the most serious prob-
lems in the maintenance of discipline that confronts
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officers. There are many men v/ho sincerely believe
their failure in the Navy is based solely upon their
officers disliking them. Then, there is the possibil-
ity that officers may find certain individuals upon
Whoa they can rely and may fail to give the other
members of the group opportunities to prove themselves.
It is admittedly difficult to be fair and impartial
in dealing with a large group of men. Nevertheless
impartial treatment is essential in order to maintain
positive discipline in the organization.
7. The men must have confidence in and respect for their
officers 1 professional ability.
This point is well illustrated by Army polls used
during the last war to find out what the American
soldier thinks about the problems of Army life.
. . .
Soldiers have been asked what they think
makes a good leader. . .they say they like and
respect competence in a leader more than any other
single attribute.
5
It is possible for an officer to be popular with-
out being respected, but such a phenomenon occurs so
infrequently in the Navy as to be neglected. Practi-
cally everyone desires to be popular, which comes
back to one of the psychological factors stated in
the first chapter, the desire for recognition. How-
ever, for men to have a sense of security, both present
and future, they must have confidence in their officers'
professional ability. It should not be overlooked that
$B« 0. Boring (ed.), Psychology for the Armed Services ,
con: The Infantry Journal', 1945), p. 468.
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while officers are sizing up men for job assign-
ments, the men are also forming opinions of the
officers* abilities. The men have an advantage in
numbers and ability to compare notes. There are
many officers in the Navy who are respected and
popular, some who are respected and unpopular, bat
few indeed who are not respected but popular.
8. The men should be kept informed of their mission in
the sense that they are headed toward a definite
objective.
It follows that the more clearly men see the
goal or objective, the more they will be motivated.
If planes are being prepared for long over-water
flight | the ship is being prepared for the annual
ilitary Inspection; the engineering plant checked
before a full power run; or the ship is being prepared
for Day Battle Practice, the men should know it. The
writer does not advocate explaining to enlisted men
the reasons they should obey orders, but rather keep-
ing them informed of major missions and giving them
the sense of "belonging" and "importance" to the I*avy.
9. There should be delegation of authority with corres-
ponding responsibility as far down in the organization
as competence exists.
ost men desire to accept responsibility if they
feel capable of doing the job. It makes them feel
they are important and are doing something worthwhile.
There are many routine jobs in every unit that can be

45
assigned to an individual as a sole responsibility,
thereby insuring that the job v/ill be done well with
a minimum of supervision.
Effects of Negative Discipline on Motivation
In an ideal situation the necessity for negative
discipline would not exist, dowever, there are occasions when
every officer must fall back on negative discipline as a last
resort . On the other hand, there are a few officers who feel
that the best way to get positive action by men is to be
severe with them, to keep them in constant fear of being punish-
ed or losing status. This doubtful gain in efficiency is more
than outweighed by destroying initiative with the resulting
desire of the men to escape, or to do only the amount of work
which will get them by without punishment,
Negative discipline is primarily based upon fear - -
the fear of physical pain, embarrassment or the threatened loss
of status. The greatest of these fears is threatened loss of
status. Fear is one of the strongest of human emotions, and
if intense it will cause fatigue, anxiety, depression, worry,
and a desire to escape. Needless to say, fear or negative
discipline should be used only in those cases where all other
methods of positive discipline have failed. Punishment is a
powerful weapon for motivation. It should be used only when
consideration has been given to its possible consequences.
In the following pages, a few of the more significant
items pertaining to the correct administration of negative dis-
cipline will be listed and discussed briefly.
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1. It is the certainty of punishment and not the
severity that makes it an important factor in
maintaining discipline*
History of many centuries shows that severity
of punishment alone has never provided an answer to
disciplinary problems. If fear of puni sliment is to
act as a deterrent, it must be certain. To overlook
punishment is to reduce its corrective value and also
to risk its omission. If punishment is uncertain there
will be a few adventurous souls who will be willing to
take a chance, with the result that more and more
violations of the regulations will occur,
A study of the ilrticles for the Government of the
Navy reveals the so-called "punitive" articles serve
not only as a naval penal code with emphasis on cer-
tainty of punishment, but as a schedule of limitations
of punishments which may be adjudged by various of-
ficers charged v/ith the administration of justice.
The first of these seventy articles defines the doc-
trine of naval discipline and should be read carefully
and understood by all officers. This article will be
quoted for purposes of refreshing officers of its
contents and making candidate officers aware of its
implications in administering negative discipline.
Article 1. Commanders ! duties of example and
correction. The commanders of all fleets, squad-
rons, naval stations and vessels belonging to the
avy, are required to show In themselves a good
example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and sub-
ordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the con-
duct of all persons who are placed under their
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command; to guard against and suppress all
dissolute and immoral practices, and to cor-
rect, according to the laws and regulations of
the *avy, all persons who are guilty of then;
and any such commander who offends against
this article shall he punished as a court-
martial may direct.
6
2. In the administration of negative discipline, punish-
ment must be impartial to all individuals and all
groups.
The individual who receives a Summary Court
.rtial for committing an offense, while another
iilty of the same offense escapes with a warning,
has a right to feel that the sense of justice has
been violated. If punishment is to serve as a deter-
rent by providing an object lesson to the wrong-doer
and a forcible example to others that the offense
must not be repeated, then punishment should not only
be certain but impartial. Equal justice under the
lav/ has a deep meaning to all Americans. It is not
sufficient that naval court-martial affords more pro-
tection and more reviews for the individual than ever
accorded a defendant under civil lav/; it must be true
also that all individuals committing the same offense
shall receive the same type of punishment.
During the past war when relatively inexperienced
officers were administering discipline, it v/as found
that a wide variation of punishments were being ,:iven
for identical offenses. This was particularly notice-
able fremthe offenses "absent over leave" and "absent
aval Justice (restricted), (Washington J Government
Printing Office, 1945), p. 510.
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without leave," which comprised about seventy-five
percent of all offenses committed. Obviously, varia-
tion in punishment for the same offense is not condu-
cive to good discipline.
In order to counteract this wide divergence in
assignment of punishment for absence offenses, the
Secretary of the %vy issued a policy letter to pro-
mote uniformity in the assignment of punishment • ?
Exceptions to this policy could be made where investi-
gation or evidence indicated the ends of justice would
be better served by a lesser or greater punishment
than prescribed, iiov/ever, a separate letter explain-
ing the reasons for deviation from this policy must
be attached to the record of the court-martial.
Prom studies made in industry and in school
systems, it appears that this policy of setting fixed
penalties for given offenses merits serious consider-
ation as a permanent policy for administering equal
punishments for all standard offenses throughout Navy
es tabli shment s
•
3. Puni shment should be administered as soon after the
offense is committed as practicable.
Not only should punishment be impartial and
certain, but it should be administered as soon after
the offense as practical in order to obtain maximum
effectiveness. Delay is detrimental to morale since
"^Secretary of the ^avy, SecHay Circular Letter 45-529
dated May 1945
, (Washington: Navy nepa~rtmeT^HG345 ) , p."l - 4T"
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It causes worry and uncertainty in the offender
•
In addition, the loss of man days has an adverse
effect upon the efficiency of the Navy.
4. In the administration of negative discipline it
should be emphasized that it is the "system" and
not an individual punishing the offender.
Men should he instructed to accept the fact that
they a e playing under certain rules of the game, and
if they violate any of these rules, they are penalized
accordingly. Never should they have reason to feel
t^ere is discrimination against them nor that the
punishment is personalized. Under the Navy's concept
of discipline, punishment is not personal; it Is not
vidictive; nor Is It inflicted as revenge for mis-
conduct. Certainly anger should never be allowed to
enter into the administration of discipline.
5* Punishment once administered should be forgotten.
Men should be made to feel, after they have paid
the penalty for violation of the regulations, that it
will not be held against them. Although records of
offenses are required in order to determine chronic
offenders, a man should not be made to feel that he
Is an outcast due to one offense. The value of punish-
ment lies In the fact that the offense must not be
repeated, not in the branding of an Individual as a
dangerous character. The penalty should not take
away the inclination to remedy the error, but rather
encourage the individual to mend his ways.
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6* The loss of individual status is the most severe
punishment that can be inflicted.
This point is emphasized by the announced policy
of the Navy Department which disapproves the imposi-
tion of solitary confinement upon petty officers
because it has a degrading effect upon the man. Great
care should be used when administering discipline
which has the tendency to destroy an individual's
status with his shipmates, I sequently this type
of punishment does more harm than good, as it leaves
the man with no other alternative than to be a dis-
ciplinary problem in order to gain recognition.
Discipline Derived from Formal Organization
Formal organization may be defined as the structural
relationship set up to obtain coordination and cooperation of
a group to carry out a mission. Too often the value of good
formal organization is not appreciated as a means of gaining
and maintaining positive discipline. The necessity for main-
taining a structure whereby authority and responsibility are
clearly defined for each individual in the group should be
apparent to all naval officers.
:ch criticism and ridicule of military organizations
has been made during the past few years. No doubt some of the
criticism has been justified; however, it has been found that
when writers or lecturers wish to emphasize a strong point in
organization, they frequently use the military line and staff
organization as a good example. Actually, the major difference
between large industrial and military organizations is that
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the former are more frequently based upon the individual's
abilities while the military organization is, by necessity,
based upon the job*
As a rule, naval organizations are dynamic and
subject to constant and sometimes Imperceptible changes, New
equipment, new methods, new objectives, or new personnel com-
plements necessitate changes in the organization. When such
changes are effected, great care should be exercised in making
the correspond! rig changes in the Ship's Organisation Book,
Watch-Quarter-Station Bills, Ship's Orders, and other related
organizational implements.
One authority on the subject of business organiza-
tion states:
The mere desire to work harmoniously and effec-
tively together is not enough. The organization struc-
ture must be properly adapted to a given situation to
make it effective. In the absence of a clearly defined
authority and fixed responsibility there will be much
hesitancy and wasted effort.
8
The extent to which negative discipline mu3t be
used is largely an index of management's efficiency in
developing positive discipline ... A group of super-
visors or men cooperate readily when they have been con-
ditioned as a result of positive discipline to the point
of thoroughly understanding (1) the principles under-
lying the organisation of which they ar. a part, (2)
the aims of the enterprise, and (5) the policies which
guide their work. Persons equipped with this knowled e
and understanding handle their responsibilities with
ease; t?ney do not need elaborate written procedures or
detailed instructions from their superiors. Their de-
cisions are generally sound because they are based on
a broad background of principles and policies .9
• B* Snriegel, Principles of business Organization ,




Some of the Navy's ablest officers direct their
abilities to developing and maintaining a practical and ef-
ficient organization. This problem is under constant study
and changes are based upon many variable conditions. When
failures in organization do occur, they are most often due
to lack of understanding and appreciation on the part of of-
ficers in the lower echelons.
One fact is certain; positive discipline cannot
exist in an organization In which the men do not know what
they are to do, when they are to do it, or why they are to do
it. All officers would do well to study their organization
charts, books, and bills in order to keep these Instructions
up-to-date. In this manner, officers and men of the command
are able to know what is expected of them.
Effects of Informal Organization on Discipline
An authority on business organization has said one
of the reasons that new wartime industries had difficulty in
getting production started was a lack of Informal organization.
This statement will be readily accepted by any officer who has
passed through the ordeal of commissioning and shaking down a
new ship. It takes time for cliques to form and for Individuals
to find out who f s who and what f s what. Bernard in Functions
of the Executive says:
. . .
that formal organizations, once established
in their turn also create Informal organizations; and
. . . that informal organizations are necessary to the
operation of formal organisations as a means of communi-
cation, of cohesion, and of protecting the integrity of
t e Individual. 10
lOChoster T. Bernard, The Functions of the Executive B
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 123.
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When "Ski" invites ***** to the signal bridge, or
the First Lieutenant suggests that he and the Gunnery Officer
step into the wardroom for a cup of coffee, it does not neces-
sarily mean they are loafing, but rather that the ship's in-
formal organization is functioning. any decisions are made,
or conflicts settled over a cup of coffee, that otherwise
would have to be dealt with through official channels. No
set of official channels can be built deep enough and wide
enough to carry all the traffic that is handled through in-
formal organizations*
The formation of cliques or social groups is a natu-
ral growth in any organization* They exist not only among the
v/orkers but also among supervisory and management personnel.
These cliques form within the bounds of the formal organiza-
tional structure but never show in the organization book or
chart.
In the "Hawthorne Studies," fourteen nen representing
three occupational groups - - wirenen, soldermen, and inspec-
tors, working in the Bank Wiring Observation Room were ob-
served on this subject. It was found that they formed in
cliques with the following basic sentiments:
1. Yo': should not turn out too much work. If you do,
you are a "rate buster."
2. You should not turn out too little work. If you
do, you are a "chiseler."
You should not tell a supervisor anything that will
react to the detriment of an associate. If you do,
you are a "squealer."
4. You should not attempt to maintain social distance
or act officious. If you are an inspector, for
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example, you should not act like one.
11
t Six of the iien, considered the best clique, con-
formed to all of the above rules, while five men formed a
group considered undesirable conforming to rules one, three
and four. Three of the workmen did not belong to either of
the groups.
Not all cliques that form are for the best interest
of the iiavy. As in civilian society, certain groups form
that are a menace to the poople. In civil life the police
frequently are able to break up such a gang by arresting one
or more of the leaders. In the same manner the Navy should
take steps to break up undesirable cliques. Close study of
the men should be made to find out what cliques do exist by
observing the groups that go ashore together, those who attend
the movies tc r, and other such group associations. If
it is found that certain members of a group become disciplin-
ary problems, the chances are the clique is an undesirable
one. Ring leaders should be transferred or other appropriate
action taken to break up the group.
The important point of informal organization is
that cliques do exist in I ivy at all levels. The cliques
ose basic sentiments are favorable can be used to advantage
for maintaining posit5.ve discipline while the undesirable
cliques are a menace and should be broken up.
11is'. J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 22.
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Effect of the Lack of Discipline
isiness executives, educational leaders, and
psychologists all appear to agree upon one basic cause for
deterioration of discipline. "This is the failure to abolish
an order, a rule, a regulation, or a law that is not observed
by a group for any reason whatsoever. It is not important
if a man fails to salute an officer, but what is important
is the man and officer have both failed to carry out a direc-
tive from duly consituted authority. This results in a
marked psychological change in attitude towards all rules
and regulations. The now defunct prohibition amendment is
a good example of a law that could not be or was not enforced.
Not only was this particular law openly and freely violated,
b there was a general let-down among the people in respect
for all lav/s.
Theve are many instances in history that show fail-
ure of an army or country due to lack of discipline. Briga-
dier General C, T # Lanham has analyzed eight famous cases of
t oops becoming dem^r.illzed due to lack of discipline. Three
of these cases are abstracted in the paragraphs below:
First case:
Date: November 9, 1870 Place: Coulmiers, Prance
Panicked troops: Rayeau Cavalry Division of the French First
Army.
Enemy: I Bavarian Corps of the German Army.
Predisposing situation:
Troops had been hastily organized, were poorly trained
and poorly disciplined. " *
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They were despondent from many defeats, and Impressed
with the superiority of the Germans.
The:/ were ordered to turn the right flank of the
Bavarians, Who were about to retreat.
They W»r« told that their loft flank would be covered
by French irregulars.
Progress was slow and difficult; the Bavarian artillery
had°inflicted a few casualties on the French.
Immediate stimulus:
Patrols rushed in reporting that Germans were driving
in on French left flank. (There wore no Germans there;
the patrols mistook the French irregulars for German
troops.
)
The report spread rapidly among the troops.
Results
:
They fled to the rear until they reached their bivouac
area of the morning*
The Bavarian Corps, although greatly outnumbered by the
French, made good Its retreat .12
Second case:
Date: November 1, 1896 Place: Adowa, Abyssinia
Panicked Troops: Italian Army.
Enemy: About 100,000 Abyssinian spearmen.
Predisposing situation:
Bad night march through wild mountain passes.
n had straggled and at dawn they found themselves
separated by Aeep ravines into three parts.
Officers and nen had never worked with each other, or
the infantry with the artillery. There was a lack of
trust and faith in one another.
Troops had heard that the enemy tortured and mutilated
their prisoners.
Troops heard their commander express fear at being
separated from the rest of the
Immediate stimulus:
Troops of the left part were suddenly confronted by
milling, savage hordes.
Their artillery failed to get the range and was not ef-
\ fective.
lSEdwin G. Boring, (ed,), Psychology for the Armed
Forces




3n flung away their rifles and rushed towards the
center, which was then stampeded towards the right.
They clubbed down officers who sought to rally them.
Only 3,500 of the 15,000 men escaped. 13
Third case:
Date: August 1, 1904 Place: Haitshong, Manchuria
Panicked troops: Russian Rifle Brigade.
Enemy: Japanese troops.
Predisposing situation:
Poor morale. Dissension and petty feuds among the
troops.
Troops depressed by Japanese victories.
(Nevertheless these troops were well trained, well
equipped, well fed, rested, and in secure positions
in reserve behind the lines.)
Immediate stimulus:
Soldier, relieving himself in a rice field, v/as star-
tled by something and set up the cry: "The Japanese are
coming!"
The cry spread at once.
Results:
n grabbed their rifles and fired in all directions.
Then they fled. General iCuropatkin himself failed to
quiet ther
.
One part of t-'iom fled to a camp of corps trains and
panicked them.
This part i?as not rallied for several days.
The other part fled to the camp of a regiment with good
morale, and was restored to order by the calm demeanor
of these troops .^
Students of modern history are familiar with the
handicap the Russian Army was under during the early months of
rid War II. Their "war Commissars" and "Regimental Commis-





ment, :;ave the army a formal organization of divided res-
ponsibility and authority which did not work in combat. It
must be said to the Russians' credit that it did not take
them lon^ to correct these deficiencies after their first
reverses by the German Army.
The surprising defeat of the French Army in 1940
was in great part due to the relaxation of discipline. The
following quotation taken from an Snr-lish Staff Officer's
diary explains much:
ay 22nd, 1940. Still no French counter-attack
to pierce the bulge. Precious opportunities have been
thrown away. General Georges was asked point-blank
why the promised counter-attack had not heon delivered.
His liaison officer spoke for him and answered that
the General could not give orders so far in advance
of the inclinations of the divisions. This was an eye-
opener and it is only now that it is brought home to
me that the formation of soldiers' committees regu-
larized in the French Army in 1936 by lions iour Leon
Blum's regime have so far undermined discipline, G. e.G.
is definitely handicapped by the spirit of international-
ism that exists to such a great extent among the rank
and file. 15
Those individuals who advocate a more democratic
military organization, with an attendant relaxation of disci-
pline, would do well to study the above accounts. Division
of authority and responsibility lead to indecision at crucial
moments, which in many cases can be more disastrous than
positive action of any sort. The relaxation of discipline can
well sow a seed of doubt in the minds of military personnel as
to the necessity to obey a given order. A military organiza-
tion must exact from its members complete and self-sacrificing
l&L. A. Pennington, R. 3. Hough, Jr. and H, W. Case,
The Psychology of Military leaders lp (New York: Prent:: -- 11,
IncM 1943 J, p. 133,
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obedience to command in order to survive. A wholehearted
acceptance of this philosophy can only be gained by the
technique of utilizing discipline as a means of motivation.
Conclusions
In summarizing this chapter on discipline as a
means of motivation, the following points are considered
most important:
1. Too often discipline is thought of in the nega-
tive sense, while as a matter of fact, positive discipl*
is more effective and plays a more important part In any or-
ganization than does negative discipline.
2. The motivating effect of discipline cannot be
measured on a scale. Both positive and negative discipline
exist to a greater or lesser extent in most organizations.
3. The important factors to be considered in gain-
ing and maintaining positive discipline are as follows:
(a) Create a general atmosphere of approval.
(b) Let the men know what is expected of them.
(c) -en should know for certain that their officers
will support them.
(d) ilen should be kept informed of the progress
they are making.
(e) Men should be kept Informed of any changes
that will affect their sense of security.
(f
)
Hen must know that they will receive impartial
treatment.
(g) Hen must have confidence in and respect for
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their officers 1 professional ability,
(h) y~en must be kept informed of their mission.
(i) lien should be given as much responsibility
and authority as they can take.
4. Important factors to be considered in adminis-
tering negative discipline are the following:
(a) It is the certainty and not the severity of
punishnent that makes negative discipline ef-
fective as a motivating factor,
(b) Punishment must be impartial to all individuals
or groups.
(e) Punishment should be administered as soon after
be offense is committed as practical.
(d) lien should be made to feel that it is the
"system" and not the individual administering
the punishment.
(e) Punishment once administered should be forgot-




Loss of status is the most severe punishment
t at can be administered.
5. The benefits derived from maintaining good formal
organization charts, books, and bills are not fully appreciated
by all naval officers as a means of maintaining positive disci-
pline.
6. Formation of cliques is a natural growth in any
organization and is necessary in order to conduct semi-official
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Irusiness. These cliques should be studied carefully by
all officers as means of maintaining positive discipline*
Undesirable cliques should be broken up by transfers, or
other measures taken to isolate the leaders.
7. Failure to cancel orders, rules, or regulations
that are not enforced for any reason whatsoever, will cause
deterioration of discipline in any organization.
8. ilistory has shown that divided command and
authority will not function with the efficiency required for
conducting a successful war.

R III
COMPETITION AS A MEANS OF MOTIVATION
Introduction
The preceding two chapters have dealt with basic
psychological factors and discipline as related to motiva-
tion. In this chapter the background, types, and effective-
ness of competition as a means of motivating men in the I^avy
will be investigated. Since the specific rules and organi-
zation of Navy competition now in effect are classified in-
formation, no comment will be made on them. Rather, the
general features of all types of competition will be analyzed
objectively to familiarise officers and candidate officers
with the problems of competition used as a means of motivation.
Competition may be defined as a desire or struggle
to excel in a contest. To some people this definition con-
notes an honorable and praiseworthy desire for excellence In
\formance, while to others, it implies a vicious means of
establishing personal superiority. There is sufficient liter-
ature on the subject to support either conception. Neverthe-
less, it is certain that If competition is to be used as a
tool of motivation instead of a weapon against it, care must





Background of Competition as a ICotJvatlnp: factor
The American way of life, or system of free enter-
prise, is based upon an equal opportunity for all people to
compete for financial, social, educational, athletic, and
other forms of rewards. It can be 3hown that throughout re-
corded history men have used competition as a means of motiva-
tion. The Roman "laurel" presented to the winner of a chariot
race has its counterpart in the "horseshoe of roses" presented
to the winner of the Kentucky Derby. The Olympic Games are
an example of competitive sports which .ave been passed down
through the centuries and revived in recent times.
T ,.e dinners of the Rose Bowl Game, the National
League Championship, and the World's Heavyweight Champion-
ship, are examples in sport of individuals or groups receiv-
ing prestige and rewards for superiority. War i3 the ulti-
mate example of competition in its worst form; two or more
countries compete for desired social and economic prizes.
There always have been various types of competition among
peoples, and it is highly probable that there always will be.
One of the most widely discussed subjects in the
Hftfy is the value of competition as a means of motivating men
in a training situation. There are some officers who believe
competition is a noxious means of making crooks out of other-
wise honest men. They feel competition and rivalry should be
de-emphasized for fear it is likely to defeat the very ends
for which it was invoked. Actually, these officers have much
factual data to support their beliefs. Hartsharne and
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May1 in their studies of deceit among school children made
the startling discovery that among a certain group which
had been artificially stimulated to honesty through, rewards
there was actually more dishonesty than among the average.
These students were so strongly motivated by the desire to
win prizes that they were dishonest in order to win prizes
for honesty.
As a group, psychologists and educators have a
tendency to de-emphasize the value of competition. One
authority says: "• . • avoid competition among members of a
fyroup if it tends to foster jealousy, conceit, and hard feel-
ings. "2
On the other hand, there are those naval officers
just as sincere who believe there is no substitute for com-
petition as a means of motivating a peace time Ilavy in the
science of training for war. These officers point out that
skill and knowledge developed through the use of "Order for
Gunnery Exercises" was the major factor in making our naval
gunnery, both aerial and surface, the most effective among
navies during the past war.
It is believed the first instance of engineering
competition in any group of ships operating under definite
rules was instituted during the Oreat Vhife* Fleet's cruise
around the world. A fleet General Order issued in January
3-Hugh Hartsharne, and Mark A. May, Studies in
Deceit
.
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1928), Book One, pp.
339 - 343
^Charles Elmer Holley, l-lipji School Teachers * Methods
(Champaign: The Garrard Press, 1937), p. 45.
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1908 by Rear Admiral R. B« Evans, U.S.N. , established two
separate group competitions, one for battleships and one
for destroyers. The results of this competition in fuel
economy are well illustrated by the following cablegram
sent to the Wavy Department by the Commander-in-Chief of
the Fleet:
Navigation, Navy Department, Washington
i'or Equipment: Reduce estimates coal required
Colombo from twenty-three thousand to eighteen thousand
tons, Negro Bay from twenty-four to twenty-one thousand
tons, revised estimates rendered necessary by decreased
consumption shown since leaving San Francisco, Fleet
sails eighteenth,
SperryS
Those officers who favor competition can also point
out an even more important factor than economy was gained
during this engineering competition; that was engineering
reliability. A second quotation from this same reference
gives an excellent indication of the value of this competition
for improvement in material readiness:
It is useless to speculate as to the outcome if
the voyage around the world had been made without com-
petition. It was freely predicted, before the voyage
began, that a trail of broken-clown battleships would
mark the course from Hampton Roads to San Francisco.
As the break-downs that were to afford this humiliating
spectacle could have referred solely to machinery
casualties, it can be inferred that the state of effi-
ciency of the engineering branch of the llavy was under
grave suspicion in central quarters. The fleet actually
made three times the mileage that was involved in the
cruise around South America, and adhered to a schedule
of dates of departures and arrivals almost without a
break.
... How much of the actual improvement was due
5Lt. Cmdr. S« C. Kalbfus, U. S« L., : story of Bngl -
neerinp; Competition in the Ilayy (Annapolis; U.S. ITaval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 37, I'io. 3, 1911), p. 995.
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to the voyage, and how much to the competition, can
never be ascertained. But previous voyages, of con-
siderable length had failed to produce proportionate
amounts of improvement .4
Those officers favoring competition frequently
finish their argument in support of competition by asking the
pertinent question; "What substitute is there for competi-
tion to motivate a peace time Navy in training for war?"
General Types of Competition Used in the Navy
In analyzing competition as a factor of motivation,
we find that the subject falls logically into three separate
categories:
1. Self competition under which a man desires to im-
prove his own performance, thereby placing himself
in competition with his past efforts.
2. Individual competition under which men compete with
other individuals for rewards or personal satis-
faction.
3. Group competition under which a group of men com-
petes with other groups for rewards or satisfaction.
During the pre-war years the Navy used all three
types of competition extensively as a means of stimulating
men in training. It is probable that the wide implications
of these different competitions are neither understood nor
appreciated by the younger generation of naval officers.
This subject is considered so essential to effective motiva-
tion that each of the above listed categories will be discuss-




Self Type of Competition
Self competition is the most effective kind of
motivation and, from a mental hygiene view-point, the most
healthy. Here the individual is in competition with himself
and makes an effort to beat his own best performance* The
rine who is trying to qualify as expert rifleman, the pilot
who is trying to qualify in carrier landings, the golfer who
is trying to break one hundred, or tae lav/ student who is
trying to pass the bar examinations, are all in competition
with themselves.
A good illustration of this method of competition
is the merit badge system used to stimulate boy scouts. A
boy must qualify in certain respects and pass an examination
upon the subject; he is then awarded a merit badge. Since
there are well over one hundred of these merit badges to be
won in such fields as hygiene, woodcraft, first aid, and
athletics, few boys have an opportunity to win all the badges*
Self competition used in industry . - This type of
competition is used extensively in industry where the pay of
workmen is on a piece work basis. Here the worker has an
opportunity to increase his minimum pay by producing more than
a fixed amount. This incentive system makes it possible, in
some industries, for workmen to Inornate their "take home" pay
by as much as fifty percent when they seriously strive to do
so. The rules for these competitions outlined in such as
the Kalsey Plan, the Rowan Premium Plan, and the Ganatt Task
and Bonus System, are based upon a guaranteed minimum daily
wage plus a bonus in pay for workers exceeding a set standard
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of production. Management and the worker divide on a per-
centage basis the premiums made in excess of a fixed stand-
ard of production. One disadvantage of this system is that
some formulas used for computing bonuses are rather complica-
ted and not always under-stood by the individual.
i any workers object to this type of incentive sys-
tem on the basis that management receives the major benefits
from increased efficiency. Hen often will not work at all,
and will rarely work well under such competition if the rules
from their point of view are unsatisfactory. Unions are gener-
ally opposed to incentive systems for workers as they believe
that management uses the system as a means of "speed-up", and
that after workers become proficient in their jobs and produc-
tion is increased the piece rates v/ill be reduced.
Self competition used in the Navy . - Self competition
as a means of motivation has been used extensively in the Navy.
Submariners, aviators, range finder operators, deep sea divers,
un pointers, expert riflemen, etc., are all required to meet
certain physical, mental and emotional standards, and upon com-
pletion of the course successful candidates are given a badge
of one kind or another. Since these distinctions usually are
open for all men who desire to compete, and require only per-
sonal ability for achievement, they are considered an excellent
means of gaining and maintaining interest of men in a given
field.
Naval aviation has used this system of self competi-
tion to an excellent advantage in training. Pilots and air-
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crewmen arc awarded "E^s in Individual Battle Practice
for dive bombing and horizontal bombing, and proficiency
in firing machine guns and torpedoes. If they fulfill given
requirements and make a score above a certain standard which
is considered excellent, and *B* may be painted on their plane.
Pilots and aircrewmen will spend days checking their equip-
ment, and many hours analyzing such effects as air-speed, wind,
drift, and muzzle velocity, in an effort to qualify for this
coveted prize. Actually the award is nothing more than a
merit badge which gives the individual a strong sense of achieve,
ment In that he personally has been able to qualify under cer-
tain set requireinents and he has made an "A* In the course.
Self type of competition utilized as a means of
stimulating ships or units . - A very effective means of using
the self type of competition among ships or groups is to as-
sign awards to those units making a high improvement factor
over their previous competitive period performance. In this
manner a ship or unit is in competition with its own perform-
ance of the previous year.
This method has been used to good advantage in cer-
tain fields of competition by assigning red "E fft s to those
units which show marked Improvement over their own previous
performances. Since this type of competition is considered
the most effective kind, the subject warrants serious study
to determine whether or not the base can be broadened to pro-




iieed for increasing self competition awards in
the liavy . - There is an urgent need in the Wavy to broaden
the base for self competitive awardr, particularly in the
lower ratin -;s. A man may be an excellent seaman but may
never make a satisfactory petty officer. Promotion alone
is neither satisfactory nor, in many cases, desirable. What
is needed is some device whereby a second cruise seaman has
an opportunity to qualify for a distinction that sets him
apart from the group. Serious consideration should be given
to developing an award similar to the Army ! s "Combat Infantry
Badge «" Such a distinction could be given a title such as a
"Seafaring Badge" • Requirements for this badge should be
based upon a given number of years sea service with minimum
required marks in conduct and proficiency in rating. Tests,
both mental and physical, should be based on performance as
far as practicable, Qualification should be so rigid that
the award would mean something to the winner, but at the same
time it should be within the capacity of a none-too-" right
searaan.
The qualifications for such a badge could be increased
to include petty officers, making it far more difficult for
a Chief Petty Officer to win the award than for a coxswain*
There are even possibilities of including officers in these
qualifications, which would serve as a stimulant for self-
improvement among them. At the same time such a program would




The adoption of such an idea requiring periodic
qualifications, would serve as a strong stimulus for improve-
ment and provide an opportunity for recognition to a large
group of Navy men who otherwise have little opportunity to
dist5.nguish themselves. If the idea of a "Seafaring Badge"
were accepted by the men as a means of achieving an honor
for which some officers or petty officers fail to qualify,
it is certain that much improvement could be made in the
Navy physically, mentally, and emotionally*
Individual Type of Competition
Of all the types, individual competition has the
least to offer as a means of motivation in the Navy. Actually,
this form will frequently do more harm than good unless care-
fully supervised. In individual competition among a large
group of men there can be only one winner; the rest must neces-
sarily be losers. Individuals who believe themselves incapable
of winning the prize have little interest in the contest. A
short, fat man is not interested in competing for the high jump,
nor will a dull normal student care which person stands first
in the class. For the few men that have a chance to win the
prize of standing first, individual competition is a powerful
stimulus, but the greater percentage of the group will show
little or no interest in the contest.
The ancient Greeks recognised the limitation of in-
dividual competition where there was only one winner in a con-
test. Partial compensation was made by introducing the pen-
tathlon in the Olympic Games with contestants participating
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in five events. At a much later date the decathlon was also
introduced into the games as a composite contest consisting
of ten events in track and field, in order to draw additional
participants. In modern times, efforts are made to induce
entries by awarding prizes not only for the winner but for
second and third places. In horse racing, money can be wagered
on a horse to win, place or show.
Individual fleet championships have doubtful value
as a means of motivating a group of men. An individual train-
ing for a particular event may neglect his work to such an
extent that he becomes a burden upon his shipmates. There is
always the possibility the man*s sense of importance will be-
come so great that he will be egotistical and unpopular. This
discussion is not considering the values of Fleet Champions
as a morale factor in a unit, since we are concerned only with
individual competition as a means of motivation.
Individual fleet championships give a few men high
status and indirectly reflect prestige upon the groups of which
they are members. This in turn makes the groups feel important,
thereby gaining some psychological benefits. Nevertheless,
it is the writer's firm opinion that the same amount of time
and effort which is expended in developing individual champions
would be far more valuable to the Navy if it were spent on
developing the abilities of larger groups of men.
Group Type of Competition
It is in this type of competition that the Navy finds
its most useful means for motivation. A man who is not interes-
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ted in self or individual competition will most likely put
forth considerable effort for his gun crew to win a coveted
"Ew in Short Range Battle Practice. A student who is re-
quired to maintain certain academic standards in order to
play on the team will frequently show a burst of academic
ability that startles his instructors. I-Ien will save fresh
v/ater and turn out lights to conserve fuel on a ship standing
high in the engineering competition when they otherv/ise never
would have become economy minded.
Group competition develops ^roup interest .- A highly
desirable feature of group competition is the development of
rap interest. vVhen groups are given a task or mission to
perform with the opportunity to excel and thereby gain prestige,
such a task becomes a challenge to their ingenuity. The men
individually and collectively will devise ways and means to
accomplish the task with the greatest efficiency, ideas on
performance are advanced and discussed as to effectiveness
under various conditions. Analyses are made of the strength
and weakness of the competing groups. The entire group fre-
quently will become intensely interested in ways and means to
win the award.
This group interest is of particular value to the
Havy in training large numbers of men. Interested men will
learn more about material and operational characteristics of
their equipment than could ever be taught in a class room.
The superior and more intelligent men will instruct and assist
baclrward members of the group in order to bring the overall
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performance of the team to a state of proficiency which will
enable them to win the award.
The possibilities are unlimited for using group com-
petition as a means of gaining men's interest in operating
and maintaining complex equipment. This technique should be
used to the fullest extent possible in the ^avy.
Group competition develops cooperation . - Wot only
does group competition stimulate learning in professional
subjects, but what is even more important, it develops team-
work. The flight deck of an operating carrier would be a
nightmare without the smooth coordination of the flight dec':
crew, Every man, from the plane pushers to the landing signal
officer, has an important part to play. Any failure by in-
dividuals in the group will lead to certain confusion if not
to serious trouble or injuries. An example of group competi-
tion producing coordination among groups is an air operation
of several carriers in formation. Each ship makes a strong
bid to be first in completing the assigned operations and to
be the first to haul down M fox" flag, indicating the task has
been completed.
The development of team work in the Navy has not
on overlooked; rather the means for getting coordination
has not always been understood, Group competition is a force-
ful stimulus for developing team play among the members of
groups performing a given task. Needless to say, all officers




Group competition in industry* - Group competition
is utilized to some extent in industry by use of group wage
plans. Bonuses are given to a group upon production of more
than a fixed number of units, and the total bonus is distri-
buted among the members of the group on some predetermined
basis. It is difficult to determine what effects these group
incentive plans have as a means of motivation through competi-
tion. Spriegel says in Principles of Business Organization ;
In group incentive plans it is desirable that
the group be small enough so that each member is
able to see the direct results of his efforts. Group
payments tend to promote cooperation and reduce cleri-
cal costs. In many cases group payments result in
emergence of an unofficial leader who acts as the
group spokesman and performs some unofficial super-
visory duties.5
Optimum number of participants in group competition . -
There is some difference of opinion as to the optimum number
of participants for obtaining maximum effectiveness in group
competition. If there are too few participants, winning the
competition has little prestige, while if there are too many
the participants in the lower half lose interest. This may
be well illustrated by an engineering competition among one
hundred destroyers. The interest and enthusiasm of the crew
of a destroyer moving from tenth to fifth place will be con-
siderably
--ore than that of the crew of a ship that has moved
from seventy-fifth to seventieth in rank order of efficiency.
The fact that there are only eight teams in the
National, American, and practically all other baseball leagues ;
°lvilliam R. Sprienel, Principles of Business Organi -
zation (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946) p. 446.
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the fact that there are nine football teams In the "Big
Nine;" eight major teams in the Pacific Coast Conference;
and six teams In the Ivy League, demonstrates that in prac-
tically all forms of team sports the number of participants
is limited to ten or less. The limiting of participants to
ten or less and six or more is too frequent to be without
significance. It appears that to obtain maximum benefit from
group competition the number of participants should be more
than five and less than eleven.
The problem In the Navy of selecting the optimum
number of participants for group competition is admittedly
a difficult one from an administrative viewpoint. The .prob-
lem varies from battleships, of which there are two in com-
mission, to destroyers with over two hundred. One solution
would be awarding a squadron "3" for the ship that stood one
in the squadron, and an additional Navy "2" for the ship that
stood one in the Navy. In a similar manner battle efficiency
pennants, communications, gunnery, athletic, and other marks
of distinction could be awarded.
Effectiveness of group competition in the Navy . -
It is the writer's firm conviction that there Is no effective
substitute for group competition as a means of motivating a
peacetime Navy in the science of warfare. Few, if any, senior
naval officers desire the return of the intensive (-roup com-
petition that existed in the late nineteen-twenties, with ships
.en a rank order rating and their standing presumably indicat-
ing their battle efficiency. Too frequently the captain's
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fitness report depended upon how well his ship fared in
the various forms of competition. Also, it must be admitted
that competition tends to develop deceit among the participants
However, none of these objections are so serious that they
cannot be overcome by good planning, careful supervision, and
proper administration of the "deterrent theory of discipline"
for those violators of the rules or spirit of the competition.
Conclusions
In summarising the contents of this chapter, the
following points are considered most significant:
1. historically, competition in one form or an-
other has always existed. The American way of life is based
upon free opportunity to compete for social, economical, and
physical rewards.
2. Studies in deceit have shown that competition
tends to increase dishonesty among school children, even when
competing for prizes in honesty. Studies indicate that conpeti.
tion tends to develop deceit among the participants.
3. Self competition is the best and healthiest
form of competition and should be utilized to the maximum
extent possible*
4. Some form of recognition is urgently needed for
Navy men in the lower ranks. An award similar to the Army's
"Combat Infantry Badge" should be made in the Navy for those
individuals who are doing excellent work in their rates but




5. Individual competition is the least desirable
form of competition for motivating men, although this type
does have some value for welfare and morale among a group.
Group competition provides the best means in
the Navy of motivating: large groups of men, particularly in
the field of training.
7. Sroup competition can be utilized to great
advantage in training inasmuch as it gains the interest of
the men.
Group competition can be used as a powerful
stimulus in developing team play among a group.
9. Too few participants in group competition
lowers prestige for the winner, while too many participants
causes lack of interest among those near the bottom. The
optimum number appears to be not less than six nor more than
ten.
10. Group competition in the Navy can be made to
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